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The meaning of citizenship for many Indigenous peoples has historically entailed assimilation
into the nation-state through colonizing education policies and practices. Several democratic
nation-states are now seeking reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and redefining the meaning of citizenship within their borders. Using recent multicultural education and the politics of
reconciliation research, this paper examines the possibility of reconciliation between nationstates and Indigenous peoples, focusing on the Maori of New Zealand and their quest for full
inclusion and citizen rights. The paper illustrates why the politics of reconciliation is viewed
as necessary to construct a political partnership that fosters a new meaning of citizenship. This
analysis suggests that a new meaning of citizenship is emerging in New Zealand because the
voices of the Maori are being recognized by the dominant group and historical injustices are
being acknowledged through the Waitangi Tribunal process.

Introduction

itics of reconciliation. Specifically, the paper focuses on the
Maori of New Zealand and their quest for full inclusion and
citizen rights. The educational experiences of the Maori entailed assimilation into the nation-state. However, the aim
of Maori education is to decolonize their linguistic, cultural,
and epistemological systems from the enduring legacy of colonization. The paper illustrates why the politics of reconciliation is viewed as necessary to construct a political partnership that fosters a new meaning of citizenship. Using the
Waitangi Tribunal as a current example of reconciliation engagement, this analysis suggests that new meanings of citizenship can emerge in New Zealand because the voices of
the Maori are being recognized and the historical injustices
are being acknowledged by the dominant group.

In what recent scholarship has described as the ‘age of
apology’ several democratic nation-states, whose histories
depend upon the colonization of Indigenous peoples, have
undergone national soul searching with their past.1 Perhaps
through present day social-ills persistent within Indigenous
communities, or the nation-state’s desire to correct past injustices, these nation-states have recognized the devastating
impact that colonizing education policies and practices have
had on the lives of Indigenous communities. Australia and
Canada have both issued government apologies for colonizing education policies and practices. In 2008, the Australian government issued a formal apology regarding the
‘Stolen Generations’ of Aboriginal children; and the Canadian government offered an apology to First Nations Peoples
for the residential boarding school system.2 As Canadian
Prime Minster Stephen Harper lamented, "The government
of Canada sincerely apologizes and asks the forgiveness of
the aboriginal peoples of this country for failing them so profoundly. We are sorry."3
What these gestures of reconciliation suggest is that a
new discourse on the meaning of citizenship is emerging between nation-states and Indigenous peoples. Nation-states
are moving beyond the assimilation policies and accommodation strategies of earlier periods to richer notions of political engagement. Yet can reconciliation help Indigenous
peoples and the nation-state reconstruct new meanings of citizenship from the legacies of cultural genocide? This paper brings together the recent literature in multicultural education concerning Indigenous peoples and explores how it
might be complimented by the current scholarship in the pol-
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Citizenship and Indigenous
Peoples
The meaning of citizenship for Indigenous peoples
has historically entailed assimilation into the nation-state.
Nation-states are sovereign, autonomous, and legal entities
that have maintained control over specific boundaries since
the modern period. Such control linked a particular group of
people to a specific territory, thus creating the modern notion
of citizenship. States Castles (2004), “Citizenship depended
on membership of a nation, seen as a cultural community,
whose members were held together by bonds of solidarity,
based on shared history, values, and traditions.”4 Those on
the outside of the nation-state’s definition of citizenship were
to be assimilated into the broader society through education
and other socio-political structures, creating “a nation-state
in which one culture—Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic—was
dominant.”5 While the nation-state considered education as
a good for developing conceptions of citizenship, in the case
of Indigenous peoples education precluded them from practicing their cultures or speaking their languages. To be a citizen meant obviating their indigeneity in favor of acceptable
forms of citizenship in the nation-state.
Grande (2004) describes a specific kind of citizenshipeducation imposed on Indigenous groups that directly contradicted their worldviews. Among these were the beliefs
in progress, individualism, and reason, as well as the belief that human beings were separate from and superior to
nature. Within the colonizing education structures, “human beings are perceived to have dominion over nature and
all beings incapable of rational thought.”6 These beliefs became deeply embedded in the educational experiences of Indigenous minds and bodies, calling for what Smith (1999)
describes as the “decolonization of the mind.”7 The concept of decolonization refers to the Indigenous struggle for
self-determination and sovereignty, such as the reclamation
of lands, revitalization of languages, and the right to selfgovern. Decolonization “seeks freedom from colonial forms
of thinking [and] to revive native, local, and vernacular forms
of knowledge.”8 It not only entails recovery from geographical and linguistic erasure as a result of colonizing experiences, but also the regeneration of the Indigenous group’s
sense of humanity and being in the world.
These experiences of citizenship-education and decolonization raise conceptual and practical problems for democratic nation-states seeking reconciliation with Indigenous
peoples. Within the lived experience of Indigenous peoples lies the spirit of resistance towards colonialist structures,
such that their “struggles are not about inclusion and enfranchisement to the ‘new world order’ but, rather, are part of
the indigenous project of sovereignty and indigenization.”9
Given that the story of citizenship for Indigenous peoples
has entailed assimilation into the nation-state, their political struggle has been a process of resistance and survival to
remain Indigenous. Rather than full citizenship inclusion,
Indigenous peoples seek greater sovereignty as nations.10
The political aim of many Indigenous groups, therefore, is
to “survive as distinct nations while participating in soci-

ety at large, but on their own self-determining terms rather
than conditions imposed by authorities.”11 This suggests that
nation-states must rethink their current political structure to
one that recognizes Indigenous sovereignty and nationhood.

Maori Education: A Colonizing
History
The colonization process of the Maori solidified in 1840
with the signing of the Waitangi Treaty. Bringing together
representatives from the British Crown and over 500 Maori
leaders, the Treaty inaugurated the new nation-state. However, the Maori soon realized that the effects of the Treaty
relegated them to colonized status. As Bishop (2003) describes, “in 1852. . . Pakeha (non-Maori, European) settlers
were empowered to take over direct control of governance
from the British, and over ensuing decades by the means of
armed invasion of Maori lands.”12 The results of these invasions disempowered the Maori to own land and participate
in the political process. The aim of Pakeha, now the politically dominant group in New Zealand, was to assimilate the
Maori into the broader society, eroding their identity, culture, and language, with education serving as a principle site
for this assimilation process. As Penetito (2009) explains,
Pakeha believed that “Maori culture, especially language, is
4
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best kept for home. . . [and] that Pakeha know best what is in
the interests of Maori.”13
Similar to other Indigenous groups, Maori children experienced the full brunt of the colonization process in the midnineteenth century with the establishment of schools. Originally beginning with mission schools in the early part of the
century, the education of Maori children eventually transitioned into state sponsored Native schools run by Pakeha
teachers and administrators. McMurphy-Pilkington (2008)
provides a general description:
These Native schools operated largely under
Pakeha-defined (non-Maori) structures, with
curriculum and values using a Pakeha cultural
perspective. The ultimate objective of the Native schools was to Europeanize Maori by instilling those norms and values that the dominant Pakeha group deemed desirable.14
The Native schools proved devastating in terms of the loss
of language for children and the Maori more generally. By
the 1880’s, Maori children attended either state sponsored
schools—the national education system for all New Zealand
children—or Native schools. The goals of both were to assimilate Maori children into acceptable forms of citizenship.
Despite the continued civilizing mission of Native Schools
into the twentieth century, Maori communities struggled to
make these schools serve their own purposes. Maori communities played key roles in deciding curriculum, choosing
quality teachers, and reporting to the Ministry of Education.
This demonstrates the active steps made by the Maori to define the meaning and future of their educational experiences
within their own communities. Simon and Smith (2001) state
that the “educational achievements were shared by the community and seemed to affirm the belief that education provided a way ahead to a better life.”15 Maori communities
transformed Native Schools in fundamental ways. They were
often seen as a source for advancement of citizenship participation in society, but with the intention of remaining Maori.
By the end of the Native School system in 1969, “there were
Maori teachers in service. . . [and] communities believed that
the schools were indeed theirs.”16
The Maori struggle for cultural and linguistic survival developed within a cultural revitalization movement, known as
kaupapa Maori. Begun in 1985, the kaupapa Maori movement responded to the growing dissatisfaction among the
Maori towards their colonizing experiences and low academic achievement among Maori students. Incorporating
traditional Maori culture, language, and epistemologies, kaupapa Maori schools are rooted within the lived experiences
of Maori families, elders, and communities. Harrison and
Papa (2005) offer an example of an Indigenous knowledge
and language program. Maori children, ages 5 – 18, learn
the traditional languages, cultures, and epistemologies for
the purpose of “providing children with knowledge and confidence in their heritage, and student achievement.”17 The
kaupapa Maori movement, however, is not only a struggle
for greater educational sovereignty or cultural revitalization.
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It also serves as an organizing principle of Maori solidarity,
commitment, and belonging within the nation-state.
Some scholars criticize the kaupapa Maori movement
for embracing a parochial neo-tribal and uncritical antimodernist position. The kaupapa Maori movement, argues
Rata (2004), is a self-conscious traditionalism that reflects
the desire to be rooted only within primordial ways of being
and knowing. Rata argues that “Kaupapa Maori education
demonstrates the features of a closed society...[whose] objectives are the restoration of tribal ties and kinship relations.”18
Such neo-tribal perspectives conflict with the value of individual autonomy promoted within democratic societies by
embracing a communal-based identity system that has negative “consequences. . . for the maintenance of liberal democracy.”19 The kaupapa Maori movement, according to Rata,
is an anti-modernist backlash against capitalist structures in
line with postmodern notions of the locality of knowledge
and rejection of meta-narratives rather than a movement to
restore authentic Maori culture, language, and epistemology.
One of the primary concerns in Rata’s criticism is that
kaupapa Maori education devalues the ideal of the autonomous critical thinker in a democratic education system.
Using the Kantian conception of the critical thinker, whose
knowledge is derived from objective principles, Rata argues
that students should have the power “to accept or reject the
ideas of their teachers.” The traditionalism valued in kaupapa Maori education creates the situation in which Maori
students would essentially regard “the family or clan or tribe
[as] the world writ large.” What Rata finds problematic is that
the community-based kinship system in kaupapa Maori education solidifies ethnic boundaries between those “political
leaders and intellectuals who make the primordial. . . a plausible history for the group” and everyone else. These boundaries maintain inequalities and hierarchies between teachers
and students, such that students blindly follow the traditions
and cultures instructed by their leaders that may require critical reflection and analysis.20
Underlying Rata’s criticisms is the assumption that the
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14
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modernist conception of individual autonomy is necessary
for the maintenance of a democratic society and its education system. Apple (2001) problematizes this assumption by
illuminating the ways individual autonomy aligns with neoliberal values. Neoliberalism holds the belief that the free
market can solve the pervasive problems in education, privileging the teaching and reproduction of “choice, competition, performance management and individual responsibility” among students.21 Individualism, according to Apple,
rather than being a neutral concept, reproduces the hierarchies and inequalities of class already present in democratic
societies. Students from lower class families lack economic
and social resources relative to middle and upper class students. The free market in capitalist democracies “systematically privilege higher socio-economic families through their
knowledge and material resources.”22 The value of individual
autonomy, in actuality, serves the interests of capitalism over
the democratic aims of equality and justice.
Apple’s critical analysis of neoliberalism aligns with the
perspective among Indigenous scholars. Democracy within
Native communities has been built on the values of “participation, solidarity, and redistribution.”23 Neoliberalism has
disrupted these values of democracy by introducing the neoliberal concepts of capitalism and individualism into community life. The way to reestablish Indigenous democratic
practices from the aftermath of the neoliberal policies “is
to rebuild democracy from the perspective of the reaffirmation of [Indigenous] culture.”24 Whereas the critics of
kaupapa Maori education regard the reaffirmation of traditional cultures, languages, and epistemologies that diminishes the critical thinking skills among students required to
maintain democratic societies, Indigenous perspectives regard community-based attachments as being central to the
idea and maintenance of democracy.
Regardless, the kaupapa Maori movement critically responds to the dominant view of colonizing education within
New Zealand. Given that Pakeha relegated the Maori
to the status of second-class citizenship, neither fully including them into the democratic process nor recognizing
their sovereign status as Indigenous peoples, full citizenship
within the nation-state for the Maori begins with the affirmation and revitalization of their languages, cultures, and epistemologies nurtured within kaupapa Maori contexts. States
Penetito, the “Maori want an education that begins with their
identification as Maori before expanding into the world at
large. . . that is designed to uphold their mana (status) as tangatawhenua (indigenous or first peoples) of Aotearoa New
Zealand.”25 For the Maori, citizenship within the nationstate initially entails strong affiliation with their identification
as Indigenous peoples. Thus any political discourse reconstructing the meaning of citizenship concerning the Maori
must take into account their aims of Indigenous affiliation,
decolonization, and sovereignty.

The Politics of Reconciliation
The politics of reconciliation have become more prominent within the political literature over the past several

decades, yet scholars debate the exact role reconciliation
should play in transitional and democratic societies. Reconciliation can refer to a set of tools or techniques, such
as “reparations and compensations, apologies, commemorations and memorials, truth telling initiatives, rehabilitations,
and amnesties”; it can refer to a set of goals, such as “nationbuilding, individual or collective healing after trauma”; or it
can refer to a set of theories “to provide a normative framework for evaluating the tools and goals of reconciliation.”26
Yet underlying these different roles of reconciliation is the
tension between religious and secular ideologies. Religious
ideologies, according Jonathan VanAntwerpen (2008), emphasize individual forgiveness and collective healing in reconciliation, while secular ideologies emphasize individual
tolerance and collective civic trust and amnesty.27
Definitions of reconciliation vary within the current political literature. Opotow (2001) defines reconciliation as
a process that “mediates a conflictual past with a desired,
peaceful future. . . [it] can move people from antagonism to
coexistence.”28 Reconciliation works through past and existing conflict between persons or groups for the purpose of
reaching some level of peaceful coexistence. Crocker (1999)
states that reconciliation can range in meaning from “simple
coexistence” to more “robust conceptions. . . [such as] forgiveness, mercy, and a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing, or harmony.”29 Such parties might not become
friends through the reconciliation process, but possibly find
healing and peace through acts of forgiveness, pardon, or
mercy. Cole (2007) defines reconciliation as a “dynamic,
complex, and long-term process, not an end-point. . . [and it
is] not synonymous with amnesia, forgetfulness, or ‘letting
go’.”30 Reconciliation is not a final state of being or a basis
for groups to forgive and forget past injustices, rather it en21
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gages estranged groups in a truthful and open-ended political
discourse.
Bashir (2008) extends these basic definitions of reconciliation and describes it as an “intergroup process that is embedded in power relations,” primarily between dominant and
historically oppressed social groups.31 Social groups are different from social associations. Unlike social associations,
such as political parties or organizations, which are voluntary, a social group “is typically involuntary and from birth.”
For the most part individuals do not choose their racial, ethnic, or national backgrounds or identities—they find themselves in the midst of these social groups. The circumstances
of these groups are not due to luck or happenstance, but
rather to the longstanding practices and policies by dominant groups within the nation-state. As a result certain social
groups present unique challenges to the nation-state because
of their historical oppression, which “give rise to a distinctive
claim for, and need for, reconciliation.” Because the injustices experienced by historically oppressed social groups persist, strategies for political accommodation and citizenship,
according to Bashir, must be reframed from mere political
inclusion to a politics of reconciliation.32
For Bashir, the politics of reconciliation must include
three main principles to help guide political engagement between dominant and historically oppressed social groups.
The first principle recognizes “the significance of the collective memory and history of exclusion.” Dominant groups
within the nation-state erase, suppress, and marginalize the
stories of historically oppressed social groups, thus “downplaying the occurrences of past harms...and [portraying] the
dominant group as not responsible for causing these harms.”
What the first principle allows for is a critical space for these
stories of exclusion to emerge within public consciousness.
These stories challenge the meta-narrative of historical amnesia usually pervasive throughout the nation-state, offering
a counter-discourse to the dominant group’s preeminence in
the national story and their understanding of citizenship. Historically oppressed social groups remain skeptical, in fact, of
“any conception of democratic inclusion that requires them
to set aside these memories of oppression and exclusion.”33
The second principle of reconciliation centers on the responsibility of the dominant group to take seriously the collective memory of exclusion voiced by historically oppressed
social groups within the nation-state. Specifically, it emphasizes the need for dominant groups to “[acknowledge] the
occurrence of historical injustice and seeks to repair them.”
This principle argues that unless the dominant group recognizes that historical injustices are not accidental occurrences
but a central part of the national story—and that they have
the moral responsibility to repair those historical injustices
towards historically oppressed social groups—it will be unlikely that the oppressed social group would want to participate in the political process. Bashir refers to the examples of
Native Americans and African Americans within the United
States who will remain distrustful and skeptical of any attempts of democratic accommodation and inclusion by the
nation-state until “the past wrongs against their ancestors are
acknowledged as an integral part of American history.”34
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The third principle of reconciliation emphasizes the complicity of dominant groups in the historical injustices of oppressed social groups, requiring “the oppressors and dominators to take responsibility for causing these injustices and
offer a public apology.” Public apologies can take on multiple forms and activities—memorials, museums, or holidays—and they must be perceived as authentic attempts of
atonement on behalf the dominant group as opposed to being symbolic gestures devoid of sincerity. The purpose of
these apologies, according to Bashir, “is not to romanticize
or perpetuate guilt or victimhood...[but rather to] help citizens. . . understand differently their history and its connection to current political, social, and economic inequalities.”
Public apologies can have positive effects for historically
oppressed social groups even when the perpetrators are no
longer living. There is the recognition that the legacies of
those injustices remain tied to the contemporary struggle of
historically oppressed social groups; and there is the realization that dominant groups still benefit from the continued
oppression of those groups.35
These principles of reconciliation compel nation-states
desiring new relationships with Indigenous peoples to move
beyond earlier approaches of assimilation and accommodation to more robust forms of democratic citizenship. Reconciliation complicates the easy solution of democratic citizenship for nation-states that attempt to smooth over historical injustices committed against Indigenous peoples, what
Rouhana (2008) describes as the “politics of historical denial.”36 There is something superficial about democratic citizenship without an honest and truthful engagement of colonization and its current impact on the lives of Indigenous
peoples. Without the stories of colonization coming into
public consciousness, together with an authentic apology and
reparations by the nation-state, the political power structure
remains intact and distrust among Indigenous peoples continues. Reconciliation establishes the conditions for nationstates to confront the colonial past and its continued legacy
head on as opposed to relegating it to something permanently
in the past with little relevance to contemporary forms of oppression over Indigenous peoples.
This leads to the insight that reconciliation compels
the nation-state to acknowledge, repair, and apologize for
historical injustices alongside seeking more contemporary
forms of democratic citizenship of Indigenous peoples. The
31
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achievement of full, democratic citizenship of minority
groups “cannot be meaningfully realized without the tangible
and intangible rectification of past injustices.”37 What this
suggests is that the nation-state cannot, morally speaking,
offer one hand of meaningful and authentic forms of democratic citizenship towards Indigenous peoples without also
offering the other hand of reconciliation. While the strategies and definitions of reconciliation might be disputed, depending on the specific localities and needs of Indigenous
communities, the politics of reconciliation situates historical memory, open acknowledgment, and public apology as
necessary conditions for dominant and Indigenous groups reconstructing meanings of democratic citizenship. Otherwise
the quest for full citizenship of Indigenous peoples remains
incomplete and superficial.

Reconciliation and New
Meanings of Citizenship
The historical narrative of Maori and Pakeha relations is
caught up within a legacy of colonization, but Pakeha now
recognize the need to repair the relationship. Penetito describes how these groups are currently entering into a new
political partnership:
[T]here is evidence that a ‘soft revolution’ is taking place in the hearts and minds (and in the
classrooms, bedrooms, and boardrooms) of New
Zealanders right now. There seems to be a tacit
acceptance by Pakeha that perhaps a majority of
Maori tribes were deeply disadvantaged by an
overly zealous colonial power and that a settled
future might depend on a public examination of
New Zealand’s history.38
The soft revolution is described as “an emerging new consensus” between the Maori and Pakeha, a “radical hopefulness”
for healing the relationship.39 There is, it seems, an effort
among both groups to recognize their joint political partnership and find new ways of engaging one another in light of
New Zealand’s colonial past.
Several voices within the Maori scholarship, however, differ as to the kind of relationship needed between the Maori
and Pakeha. These differences hinge on the meaning of Indigenous sovereignty and what it should entail. One voice
asserts that Maori sovereignty should extend over the entire nation, while another asserts that there should be the
creation of separate Maori institutions. Other voices advocate for constitutional-based power-sharing arrangements
between the Maori and Pakeha, a partnership that recognizes the sovereignty of both groups. At the center of these
voices is the Maori principle of tino rangatiratanga (chieftainship), which refers to “Maori power and empowerment;
self-determination and control over jurisdictions and destinies; [and] bi-culturalism and partnerships.”40 This concept affirms that Maori sovereignty is less about separation
or succession from the nation-state and more about “building bridges by working together in a spirit of constructive

engagement.”41 The Maori, according to this principle, are
willing to engage in the new emerging consensus.
What is taking place between the Maori and Pakeha resonates with the reconciliation process described in Bashir’s
analysis. Various events have specifically helped change
the mood in New Zealand politics and foster an emerging
new consensus between these groups. One example of addressing Bashir’s principles is the Waitangi Tribunal. Established in 1975, the Tribunal hears the stories of exclusion
among the Maori and offers an ongoing attempt by Pakeha
to “redress. . . past injustices on the part of the Crown against
tribes.”42 The Tribunal sets out “to establish a more just society. . . [and] originate out of the notion of a sense of grievance,
loss, or separation.”43 The Waitangi Tribunal resonates with
Bashir’s three principles in two important ways. The process
of storytelling suggests, first, that Pakeha are willing to hear
the stories of exclusion voiced by the Maori; and, second, the
outcomes of the Tribunal suggest that Pakeha are willing to
repair the historical injustices committed against the Maori
for the sake of a more robust political partnership.
The Waitangi Tribunal is not without criticism. Gibbs
(2006) criticizes the Waitangi Tribunal for being too immersed in the social contract and rights-based tradition.
When the Tribunal became the site to examine the Maori
demands for reparations, both groups regarded the Waitangi
Treaty of 1840 as a binding document, a contractual agreement that stands over both parties as a shared standard of
justice. Breaches to the Treaty require some form of reparations of justice, an “exacting [of] what is due or what is
demanded by the situation.”44 Yet the Treaty engenders two
dilemmas. The first dilemma recognizes that the nation-state
becomes both the wrongdoer of the Treaty and the dispenser
of justice, such that “the Crown holds most, if not all, of the
cards.” The second dilemma recognizes that the rights-based
approach relies too heavily on the accurate interpretation of
historical events. For Gibbs, “historical ‘facts’ are highly
constructed” and they are often used “to legitimate the exercise of (colonial) power.”45
Regardless, the Waitangi Tribunal brings the Maori and
Pakeha together in a political partnership to help foster new
meanings of citizenship. Examining publicly the colonial
past helps the Maori and Pakeha interpret the past in such
a way that they can reconstruct new meanings of citizenship.
Reconstructing accurate interpretations of the past becomes
37
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unnecessary and only historical interpretations can emerge
into public view. The meaning of citizenship, rather than being fixed and determined, has been a fluid and socially constructed concept within Maori and Pakeha relations.46 Specific interests since the Waitangi Treaty have compelled the
Maori to promote an Indigenous identity that created tensions between them and the nation-state’s push towards social cohesion. The Tribunal’s process of storytelling, by foregrounding multiple interpretations of the past, has created
“a sense of hope among the people for a future goodness
that transcends the current ability to understand the historical legacy.”47 Held in tension, these stories help groups reconstruct feelings of belonging within the nation-state and
move “toward mutually acceptable interpretations of those
events.”48
The Waitangi Tribunal helps restore what Gibbs describes
as mana (status) or balance between the Maori and Pakeha.
Restoring mana requires that the Tribunal be transformed
exclusively from reparation as fulfilling a social contract to
reparation as a reconciliation process. Reconciliation, instead of redressing what is due injured groups in purely legal
terms, allows “parties to move forward in a relationship of
good faith and trust.”49 The Tribunal as reconciliation brings
the Maori and Pakeha to a more equal standing and builds
trust and respect between them. Restoring mana includes
mitigating long-standing prejudice against the Maori, as well
as creating strategies to “ensure the cultural survival of the
Maori,” such as “re-establishing an economic base, return
of significant sites, and key institutional power-sharing arrangements.”50 Understanding the Waitangi Tribunal process
as reconciliation recognizes, first, the asymmetrical relationship between these groups, but then, second, works to situate
the Maori on a more equal footing with Pakeha to engender
significant, political engagement on the meanings of citizenship.
The political process of the Waitangi Tribunal illustrates
why the politics of reconciliation is necessary for Pakeha
seeking new relationships with the Maori. Two implications become important. First, given that Pakeha desire a
new relationship with the Maori—and this entails new forms
of democratic citizenship—it is necessary for them to confront their complicity in the colonizing history directly. In
the background of the political discourse of citizenship is the
colonizing, educational history of the Maori people. This
history cannot be sidestepped when the question of citizenship is raised. Doing so would be to ignore the complexity
of citizenship experiences within the national story. Thus the
Tribunal as a process of reconciliation—a process that not
only recognizes Maori educational history, but that also recognizes their aims of decolonization and sovereignty—has
become a necessary step to help Pakeha and Maori create
new meanings of citizenship and belonging.
The second implication refers to the necessity for official
apologies. What the politics of reconciliation necessitates,
and what is evident through the Waitangi Tribunal process, is
a specific way for Pakeha to publicly apologize for the colonizing policies and practices of the nation-state. Apologizing
for the enduring effects of colonization in Maori communi-
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ties strengthens the meaning of citizenship within the nationstate. Apologies, according to Gibbs, can go a long way
to improve the relationship between the Maori and Pakeha,
beginning “the healing process and recognizes tribal mana,
authority, power, and identity.”51 An apology by the nationstate signals the validation of the Maori’s story of injustice
and affirms their identity and recognition as first peoples.
Whether these groups become political friends or forgiveness
is granted on the part of Maori through the reconciliation process remains undetermined. Critical is that reconciliation and
the act of offering an official apology establish the necessary
conditions to reconstruct robust meanings of citizenship and
belonging from the legacies of cultural genocide.

Conclusion: Implications for
Education
Indigenous peoples present unique challenges to democratic nation-states. Histories of colonization reveal a story
of citizenship exclusion and marginalization, the impact of
which persists into the current social and political milieu.
Nation-states seeking political partnerships with Indigenous
peoples must find new ways to engage those groups in light
of their colonizing histories. The politics of reconciliation
provides the political framework necessary for this engagement. Reconciliation opens a dialogical space for nationstates and Indigenous peoples to engage in critical discourse
on the impact and legacy of colonization. The direct engagement with colonization in the reconciliation process in turn
establishes the conditions for an authentic discourse on new
meanings of citizenship to emerge within the public sphere.
In what ways might the politics of reconciliation inform educational practice? This paper concludes by offering two
strategies on how reconciliation might relate to education
more directly and how these strategies might further the aims
of decolonization.
The reconciliation process could relate more directly to
education, first, by developing the capacity for reconciliation among students through intentional curricular transformations in history textbooks and pedagogical practices. Cole
46
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argues that reconciliation cannot be realized among everyday citizens unless education accurately reflects what she
calls the “violent past” of nation-states within the history curriculum. States Cole, “new history textbooks and programs
can help to establish a new narrative of the nation, including a new portrayal of the self and those previously designated as Other."52 For Cole, teaching the violent past can
help students transform the perception of the Other as enemy
to equal citizen. The curricular transformation suggested by
Cole would move beyond the simple construction of curriculum, such as examining and teaching the basic facts of New
Zealand’s history, to one that intentionally utilizes the story
of colonization as a pedagogical tool to develop the capacity
for reconciliation among students as future citizens.
Another strategy would be to create pathways for the story
of exclusion and oppression to emerge among Maori students. Brayboy (2005) proposes a particular vision of critical race theory relevant for Indigenous peoples. Based on
a central tenant of critical race theory, which requires researchers “to recognize the experiential knowledge of people
of color,”53 Brayboy particularizes this tenant to Indigenous
education in what he calls tribal critical race theory.54 Tribal
critical race theory requires that the stories of Indigenous
peoples be seen as legitimate sources of data and be heard
in such a way that “value is attributed to them and both the
authority and the nuance of stories are understood.”55 The
connection of storytelling to the politics of reconciliation becomes apparent. Given that dominant groups must be willing to hear the stories of exclusion of historically oppressed
social groups, an intentional tribal critical race theory provides the space for Maori students to share their stories of
exclusion and have them be taken seriously within dominant
educational settings.
These educational strategies will help to further the important task of decolonizing the mind among Maori students.
An important claim in decolonization begins with colonized
groups becoming aware of the reality of colonization in their
daily lives.56 The first educational strategy—curricular transformation—establishes a critical space for students to interrogate the history and reality of colonization on the individual, institutional, and cultural levels. Insofar as textbooks and
pedagogies include the violent past, Maori students would
become aware of the pervasiveness of colonization in their
own minds, bodies, and communities. The second educational strategy—the significance of storytelling among Indigenous students—provides the space for Maori students to
identify how colonization has permeated their own ways of
thinking and being. Sharing stories helps Indigenous students develop the critical consciousness required for their
own liberation. Stories become sites of resistance towards
colonizing structures, serving as the means by which Indigenous peoples “turn from being subjugated human beings to
being liberated human beings.”57
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